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14.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of high-conditionality lending by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World  Bank as a part of  the 
overall management of the debt crisis. High-conditionality lending re- 
fers to the process in which the international institutions make loans 
based on the promise of the borrowing countries to pursue a specified 
set of  policies.  High-conditionality  lending  by  both institutions  has 
played a key role in the management of the crisis since 1982, though 
the results of such lending have rarely lived up to the advertised hopes. 
One major theme of this paper is that the role for high-conditionality 
lending is more restricted  than generally believed,  since the efficacy 
of conditionality is inherently limited. 
A related theme is that many programs involving high-conditionality 
lending could be made more effective by including commercial bank 
debt relief as a component of such programs. I shall argue that such 
debt relief can be to the benefit of the creditor banks as well as the 
debtors, by enhancing the likelihood that the debtor governments will 
adhere to the conditionality terms of the IMF and World Bank loans, 
and thereby raise their long-term capacity to service their debts. 
Almost by definition, countries in debt crisis that appeal to the Fund 
or the Bank for new loans have already been judged to be uncredit- 
worthy by normal market criteria. In such treacherous circumstances, 
it is  appropriate to ask why the IMF or the World Bank should be 
extending new loans. As an alternative, for example, the international 
institutions could allow the creditors and debtors to renegotiate  new 
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terms on the old loans without  any official involvement.  Such two- 
party negotiations between creditors and debtors characterized earlier 
debt crises, before the IMF and World Bank existed (see Lindert and 
Morton, chap. 10 in this volume, for a discussion of the earlier history). 
In principle, continued lending by the international institutions could 
be justified  by  several nonmarket criteria: as a  form  of  aid, as an 
investment by the creditor governments that finance the IMF  and World 
Bank in political and economic stability of the debtor country (see Von 
Furstenberg  1985a,  1985b, for such a view); as an extension of the 
foreign policy interests of the major creditor governments; as  a defense 
of the international  financial system, etc. Loans are not usually  de- 
fended on these grounds, though in fact such considerations are fre- 
quently important. Of course, these criteria are valid to an extent, but 
also extremely difficult to specify with precision as a basis for IMF- 
World Bank lending. 
Another defense of lending, also with  considerable merit in  some 
circumstances, is that the IMF (and World Bank to a far lesser extent), 
can act as a “lender of last resort,” analogous to a central bank fighting 
a banking panic in a domestic economy. The argument holds that the 
private commercial  bank  lenders to a country might  panic, and all 
decide to withdraw their funds from the country even though the coun- 
try is a fundamentally sound credit risk in the longer term (see Sachs 
1984, for such a model). In this case, lending by the IMF can eliminate 
the liquidity squeeze on the country, and thereby help both the creditors 
and the debtors. As in the case of a domestic banking panic, the IMF 
helps to overcome a well-defined market failure. 
This argument was part of the basis of the original IMF intervention 
into the debt crisis  in  the early  1980s. The argument following  the 
Mexican crisis in mid-1982 was that countries were suffering from a 
liquidity crisis, made acute by the simultaneous rise in world interest 
rates and the sudden cessation of commercial bank lending. It seemed 
at the time that the crisis could be quickly resolved  (as argued, for 
example, by Cline 1984), since it represented merely a liquidity squeeze. 
The liquidity arguments are no doubt true in some cases, but most 
observers now doubt that the developing country debt crisis represents 
merely a problem of liquidity. Six years after the onset of the crisis, 
almost no countries have returned to normal borrowing from the in- 
ternational  capital markets, and the secondary-market value of bank 
loans to the debtor countries reflect very deep discounts in valuation. 
For many countries at least, the crisis represents more fundamental 
problems of solvency and longer-term willingness to pay on the part 
of the debtor nations. 
In these circumstances, other justifications (that can be in addition 
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IMF and World Bank lending. By far the most important argument is 
that strict conditionality attached to IMF-World  Bank loans can make 
such loans sensible on normal  market terms. The assumption is that 
the international institutions are better than the banks at enforcing the 
good behavior of the debtor country governments, and therefore have 
more scope for lending. 
The importance of conditionality in justifying IMF-World  Bank lend- 
ing is certainly well placed. Nonetheless, the role for high-condition- 
ality lending is overstated, especially in the case of countries in a deep 
debt crisis. In practice, the compliance of debtor countries with con- 
ditionality  is  rather weak, and this  compliance problem  has gotten 
worse in  recent years, since a large  stock of  debt can itself  be  an 
important disincentive to “good  behavior.”  In other words, the debt 
overhang  itself  makes  it  less  likely  that  conditionality  will  prove 
successful. 
The reason is straightforward.  Why should a country adjust if  that 
adjustment produces income for foreign banks rather than for its own 
citizenry? since deeply indebted countries recognize that much of each 
extra dollar of export earnings gets gobbled up in debt servicing, a 
very large stock of debt acts like a high marginal  tax on successful 
adjustment. Therefore, two counterintuitive  propositions could be true 
when a country is deeply indebted: “Good behavior”  (such as a higher 
investment rate) can actually reduce national welfare,  by  increasing 
the transfer of income from the debtor country to  creditors; and explicit 
debt relief by the creditors can increase the amounts of actual debt 
repayment, by improving the incentive of the debtor country to take 
the necessary adjustments. 
14.2  High-Conditionality Lending by  the IMF and World  Bank 
The argument for high-conditionality lending is that the IMF and the 
World Bank can compel countries to undertake stabilizing actions in 
return for loans, thereby making  the loans prudent even when the 
private capital markets have declared  the country to be in uncredit- 
worthy. A full theory of conditionality would  have  to explain three 
things. First, if the actions being recommended to the country are really 
“desirable” for the country, why is it that the country must be com- 
pelled to undertake the policy? Second, if  the country must indeed be 
compelled to undertake the actions, what types of force or sanctions 
can be used to guarantee compliance? And third, why is it that inter- 
national institutions are better able to impose conditionality than are 
the private capital markets? 
One solution to the conundrum of why countries must be compelled 
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government accepts ex ante the need for a policy adjustment as the 
quid pro quo for a loan, but the government has a strong incentive to 
avoid the policy change once the loan is arranged. In this case, the role 
of conditionality is to bind the country to a course of future actions, 
actions which make sense today but which will look unattractive in the 
future. In other words, the goal of conditionality is to make the ex ante 
and ex post incentives for adjustment the same (where ex ante and ex 
post are with respect to the receipt of the loan). 
The question of enforcement of conditionality agreements is in many 
ways tougher than the question of why conditionality is needed. The 
justification  for IMF-World  Bank lending rests on two propositions 
regarding enforcement: (1)  that the enforcement of IMF-World  Bank 
conditionality is sufficiently powerful to result in an “acceptable” rate 
of compliance with IMF-World  Bank programs; and (2) that the official 
institutions have an advantage over the commercial banks in enforcing 
conditionality. Both assumptions are problematic. 
For both the international institutions and the commercial banks, the 
legal bases of conditionality are weak. In the domestic capital markets, 
bond covenants are legally binding restrictions on the behavior of debt- 
ors, and can generally be enforced with only modest transactions costs. 
In the international arena, particularly for loans to sovereign govern- 
ments, the transaction costs for enforcing  loan  agreements are ex- 
tremely high. As most writers have recognized recently, the main method 
of  enforcement for lenders (whether official or private)  involve  the 
threat of cutoffs of new loans to misbehaving borrowers. Such a cutoff 
in lending can of course be extremely disruptive and costly to a borrower. 
Theoretical  work  and empirical  evidence both establish  that the 
threat of a lending cutoff is a credible, but inherently limited sanction. 
Thus, conditionality, whether by the IMF and World Bank, or by the 
commercial  banks themselves, cannot, on an a  priori  basis,  be ex- 
pected  to have  the  same force  as a  binding  bond  convenant  in  a 
domestic loan. From the beginning, we should appreciate the inherent 
limitations of the enforcement mechanisms in conditionality on inter- 
national  lending. 
Conditionality  is  limited  in  effectiveness  not  only  because of  en- 
forcement difficulties, but also because of the complexity of negotiating 
with a sovereign borrower. In the case of a bond convenant, there is 
a clear legal responsibility on the borrower to carry out the conditions 
of the covenant. When a government is the debtor, however, there is 
likely to be a considerable diffusion of power within the government, 
to the extent that the individual parts of the government negotiating 
the conditionality agreement may well lack the authority to implement 
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14.2.1  The Debt Overhang and the Weakness of Conditionality 
What must also be appreciated is the fact that the current overhang 
of external debt to private creditors can greatly hinder the effectiveness 
of IMF conditionality, at least under the prevailing design of IMF pro- 
grams. Virtually all IMF programs to date have been designed under 
the assumption that the debtor country can and will service its external 
debts in  the long run  on a  normal  market basis.  The programs  are 
constructed under the maintained assumption of such normal debt ser- 
vicing. (For example, in the technical calculations in Fund programs, 
interest rates on the existing debt are assumed to be at market rates; 
the country is assumed to clear all arrears on a reasonable timetable, 
etc.) 
Contrary to this assumption, however, it might easily be the case 
that a country is better off defaulting on a portion of its debts than it 
would be with timely  debt servicing, if  such is possible (a dozen or 
more countries have indeed taken such unilateral action by 1987). There 
may  simply exist no IMF high-conditionality  program  based on full 
debt servicing, that if followed, actually makes the country better off 
than it would be without the program but with a partial suspension of 
debt payments. In other words, the IMF program might simply be too 
tight relative to the available options of the debtor governments. 
In such circumstances, four things could happen. The best outcome, 
I will suggest below, would be for the IMF to design a program that is 
actually based on partial and explicit debt relief. So far, the IMF has 
avoided this rather obvious approach, partly because it has underes- 
timated the possible efficiency gains for all parties (creditor, debtors, 
and the Fund) that might result. The second possibility is that the IMF 
and the debtor  government would fail to sign a program, and the country 
would  simply suspend payments on part of its private sector debts. 
This has been the case with Peru during 1985-87,  and Brazil in 1987. 
The third possibility,  and indeed the typical case in recent years, is 
that the Fund and the country would sign a program based on full debt 
servicing, even though both parties  fully expect that the agreement will 
breakdown in due course. Either the conditionality would be allowed 
to fall by the wayside and the country would continue to borrow from 
the Fund but without living up to earlier commitments, or the IMF 
program would eventually be suspended. 
A fourth possibility that deserves important consideration, would be 
for the IMF  and World Bank to approve programs with debtor countries 
that allow for a buildup of arrears (i.e., nonpayments)  to the commercial 
bank  creditors, in  well-defined  circumstances. These circumstances 
would include (1) a large overhang of debt that is deemed to be highly 280  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
inimical to the stabilization efforts of the country; and (2) the unwill- 
ingness of the commercial creditors either to grant relief or significant 
new financing. By allowing for the buildup of arrears to private cred- 
itors, the IMF could design more realistic programs without the need 
to press the private creditors for specific amounts of debt relief. The 
debt relief would instead emerge in the bilateral bargaining of the debtor 
and the creditors. 
14.3  The Recent Experience with Conditionality 
Multicountry  analyses of  IMF conditionality generally arrive at a 
fairly pessimistic assessment of IMF loan practices. In particular, the 
evidence suggests that IMF programs are very frequently, if not typi- 
cally, unsuccessful in restoring stability and growth in countries beset 
with balance of payments and inflation problems. As an example, in a 
review of Fund programs supported by standby arrangements in upper- 
credit tranches during 1969-78, Beveridge and Kelley (1980) found that 
fiscal targets were achieved in about half the cases, but “[bly 1977 and 
1978, expenditures were contained as planned in less than 20 percent 
of the programs, compared with over 50 percent in  1969 and  1970” 
(p. 213). Also, Beveridge and Kelley found that governments were not 
generally successful in meeting targets with respect to the composition 
of expenditure between current and capital outlays. 
Stephan Haggard’s (1985) recent review of IMF programs under the 
Extended  Fund Facility (EFF) is no more heartening. According to 
Haggard’s count, “of the thirty adjustment programs launched under 
the auspices of  the Extended Fund  Facility, twenty-four were rene- 
gotiated, or had payments interrupted, or were quietly allowed to lapse. 
Of  these  twenty-four,  sixteen were  formally cancelled  by  the IMF, 
virtually all for noncompliance” (pp. 505-6). 
Haggard’s bleak conclusions are echoed in a recent study by Remmer 
(1986) of IMF programs during 1954-84.  It is worth quoting Remmer 
at length on the question of IMF conditionality: 
Unsuccessful implementation of IMF recipes has been the norm in 
Latin America, not  the  exception.  A high  proportion  of  standby 
programs have failed to push key indicators of government finance 
and domestic credit even in the right direction. Moreover, examining 
IMF standby programs on a before and after basis shows that changes 
in key indicators are more readily attributable to chance than to the 
operation of IMF stabilization programs. The obvious conclusion is 
that the economic, social, and political impact of IMF programs has 
been overstated. To describe the IMF as a “poverty broker,” as does 
the title of a recent book, or to charge the Fund with undermining 
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a useful myth for governments seeking a scapegoat to explain difficult 
economic conditions  associated with  severe balance  of  payments 
disequilibria, but the ability of the IMF to impose programs from the 
outside is distinctly limited (p. 21). 
14.4  External Debt and Conditionality 
The theme of  this  section  is  that high  external indebtedness can 
reduce the incentives for a country to undertake necessary macroeco- 
nomic adjustments, and thus further reduce the chance that the terms 
of a conditionality agreement will  be fulfilled. Indeed, for very high 
levels of indebtedness, it may be useful for creditors to forgive some 
of the debt as an incentive for better performance, recognizing  that 
such an incentive could actually raise the repayments to creditors in 
the long run. 
There are really two linkages between a debt overhang and the ef- 
fectiveness of  conditionality, one obvious and the other a  bit  more 
subtle. The obvious linkage has already been made: In the absence of 
debt relief, a country may have no incentive to honor a conditionality 
agreement, and to carry through on an economic reform program. The 
foreign debt acts like a tax on adjustment. The debt relief removes the 
tax, and encourages the country to undertake efficient reforms. 
The second linkage occurs when debt relief is a necessary but not 
sufJicient condition for inducing the country to undertake needed re- 
forms. It may be, for example, that a prerequisite of new investment 
spending requires both new external financing and debt relief, and the 
external financing itself requires conditionality, since the creditors un- 
derstand that the country would prefer to borrow abroad and then not 
undertake the investment. 
14.5  Some Implications for the Pace and Phasing of Adjustment 
Programs 
The postwar history of stabilization, liberalization, and conditionality 
can make a pessimist of the most tenacious optimist. Few stabilization 
and liberalization  plans  meet their  initial  objectives, and many  fail 
miserably. We  have seen that conditionality is inherently limited in its 
capacity  to effect  adjustment in  the debtor countries, and that the 
limitations are even more severe in  the presence of a debt overhang. 
In many cases, debt relief might have to be combined with condition- 
ality to improve  the likelihood  of  success of  IMF and World  Bank 
programs. 
Given these limitations, it is important to make  the objectives of 
conditionality  consistent with  the limited  efficacy  of  conditionality. 282  Jeffrev D. Sachs 
Programs of the IMF and World Bank should be tailored according to 
a realistic assessment of  the possible  accomplishments. One of  the 
most important issues in this regard is the balancing of the demands 
of stabilization with those of longer-term structural reform. Since the 
major debtor countries suffer from acute macroeconomic disequilibria 
(with inflation rates in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico well exceeding 
100 percent per year in  1987), a crucial issue is the balancing of mac- 
roeconomic stabilization with other types of structural reform. 
The main theme of this section is that structural reform (especially 
a shift towards greater outward orientation and trade liberalization) is 
a very difficult process that takes many years to bring to fruition. The 
process is so difficult economically and politically that it is likely to 
fail under the best of macroeconomic circumstances, and is in general 
greatly jeopardized by a concurrent macroeconomic stabilization crisis. 
The historical record suggests that stabilization should be given tem- 
poral  priority  in  the design  of adjustment programs, with  structural 
reforms proceeding gradually and mostly after macroeconomic  balance 
has been restored. 
The historical record (e.g., as contained in the important studies of 
Krueger 1978 and Bhagwati  1978) suggests that most attempts at lib- 
eralization fail. Moreover,  a high inflation rate seems to be a serious 
hindrance in  successful  liberalization,  since in  most cases in  which 
liberalization was attempted with an inflation  rate above 30  percent, 
the experiment failed. There are several reasons for this adverse link- 
age, including the fact that fear of accelerating  inflation  may  induce 
governments to undertake inadequate devaluations  at  the start of a 
liberalization exercise, and then to fail to keep the exchange rate ad- 
justing downward in correction for a domestic inflation rate in excess 
of the world rate. 
Other research, by Killick et al. (1984) and Ching-yuan Lin (1985), 
agree with the proposition that the simultaneous application of stabi- 
lization and widespread liberalization is unlikely to be sustainable and 
successful.  Killick  notes that a degree  of  liberalization  was sought 
alongside stabilization in at least 8 of 23 standby arrangements in 1978- 
79, with  meagre results. He concludes, “It does not  seem that the 
means available  to, or employed  by, the Fund are strong enough to 
achieve its liberalisation  objective in more than rare cases” (p. 238). 
Lin has made  a  persuasive  case, this time  based  on a comparative 
economic history of East Asia and Latin America, that a reduction in 
inflation  should take precedence over all other targets, including lib- 
eralization, when inflation rates are high and prone to rise. In a detailed 
comparison of the stabilization experiences of Latin American and East 
Asian countries, Lin argues that the success of the Asian cases was 
built  on a reduction of inflation that preceeded the liberalization at- 
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In both Chile and Argentina, the control of  hyperinflation and the 
liberalization of the economy occurred at the same time [in the mid- 
1970~1.  This greatly compounded the difficulties of the domestic in- 
dustries by forcing them to cope with both the depressive effects of 
the stabilization policies and the increased competition of foreign 
producers at the same time. This contrasts sharply with the situation 
in Taiwan and South Korea, where the control of hyperinflation pre- 
ceded  intensive trade  policy  reforms  by  several  years  (chap. 4, 
Lin also points out at some length that inflation control was supported 
by a worsening rather than an improvement of the trade balance, since 
foreign funds were used  to support the governments of  Taiwan and 
Korea after the resort to money creation was brought under control: 
In all of the cases mentioned, the eventual contraction of the infla- 
tionary process required the restoration of political stability and pro- 
ductive capacity, with the injection of massive foreign aid and the 
restriction of deficit financing by the central bank playing important 
roles (ibid.). 
P. 8). 
14.6  Conclusions: Toward an Improved Use of Conditionality 
We have noted that the efficacy of conditionality is inherently limited, 
and that the current overhang of debt greatly complicates the situation. 
In cases of extreme indebtedness, the debt itself might set up incentives 
that are adverse to significant adjustment or liberalization. In such a 
case, partial debt forgiveness can actually raise the expected repay- 
ments to the creditors, while at the same time giving greater incentive 
to the country for favorable adjustment. To  be most successful, debt 
relief should almost surely be combined with IMF-World  Bank con- 
ditionality, to enhance the likelihood that the debt relief actually turns 
into economic reform. 
The historical experiences with  liberalization alone, and with sta- 
bilization alone, are not very encouraging. The difficulties of combining 
the two policy initiatives are formidable. The historical record suggests 
that it  is  virtually  impossible to bring inflation under control, while 
simultaneously trying to liberalize the economy. One is hard pressed 
to fund an example of an economy which stabilized, liberalized, and 
improved the external position all at the same time. Only South Korea, 
Brazil, and Indonesia seem to provide examples of  implementing the 
first two measures, and in those cases the programs were supported 
by  a strong military government that substantially reduced real wages 
(at least in Brazil and South Korea) at the outset of the programs, and 
by favorable world conditions, including growing world trade, and after 
a few years, access to foreign borrowing in significant amounts. 284  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
These findings suggest the following list of guidelines for improving 
the use of conditionality in future lending by the IMF and the World 
Bank. Most important, the IMF and World Bank should recognize the 
limited efficacy of conditionality, and act accordingly: 
1.  Approve fewer programs. 
2.  Require  more prior  actions in  cases where the efficacy of the 
conditionality is doubtful. 
3.  Encourage governments to enlist the necessary range of political 
support behind the terms of a high-conditionality program before 
the program is made final. 
4.  Approve programs  which  allow a buildup of arrears to private 
creditors in cases where the private creditors (a)  fail to grant debt 
relief and (b) fail to provide sufficient amounts of new financing. 
5.  Encourage the use of debt relief  schemes as a way to enhance 
the likely adherence to conditionality terms. 
6. Narrow the goals of conditionality: Make macroeconomic stabi- 
lization the preeminent  aim, with  structural reform to be imple- 
mented only as macroeconomic stability is restored. 
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